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I. INTRODUCTION 
The year 1991 marked the thirtieth anniversary of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, 1 and the beginning of the Decade for the 
Eradication of Colonialism. It was also the year in which the frag-
mentation of the Soviet Union became irreversible. And it was the 
year in which independence movements worldwide, in Croatia, Slove-
nia, Eritrea and East Timor, accelerated promotion of their claims. 
The catalyst for all these developments is the principle of self-determi-
nation. One could expect therefore that a principle so readily utilized 
in the international arena would possess a definite meaning. This is 
not the case. Current international law theory regarding self-determi-
• L.L.B with Honors Melbourne University; Senior Tutor in Law, Melbourne Univer-
sity; and Research Fellow, Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies Melbourne Univer-
sity; formerly Research Officer to Counsel Assisting the Nauru Commission of Inquiry. An 
earlier version of this paper was delivered in a joint seminar with Mr. Gerry Simpson at Mel-
bourne University in September 1991. The author gratefully acknowledges the advice and 
assistance of Dr. Hilary Charlesworth. 
1. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/L323 
(1960). 
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nation is in a state of uncertainty and confusion. It is inconsistent 
within itself, and it does not accord with state practice. 
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the need to re-think the 
principle of self-determination by establishing that an undesirable 
level of uncertainty exists regarding the usage of the term, and to 
show that a major cause of the confusion is due to the inadequacy of 
conventional approaches. These objectives will be achieved by identi-
fying and evaluating confticting approaches toward the meaning of 
self-determination, proposing an explanation for why the debate has 
evolved and suggesting which approach best serves the needs of the 
international community. 
Before analyzing the history of self-determination and how it 
evolved to encompass the current view, it is important to consider 
why it has become necessary to re-evaluate the term. As the paper 
will focus on interpretations of what constitutes self-determination, it 
is worth commenting at the outset that interpreting words, whether 
legal or not, is by its nature an imprecise process. One method of 
analyzing inconsistencies of meaning which arise in legal interpreta-
tion was proposed by Professor H.L.A. Hart.2 Hart developed the 
distinction between the "core" meaning of a legal concept, and its 
"penumbra of uncertainty." Self-determination is a term which has a 
wide penumbra of uncertainty. A number of inconsistent meanings 
have been ascribed to the term. 
The reason this confusion is critical is that it promotes an unsta-
ble international environment by failing to provide a consistent mea-
sure upon which groups can rely. In this volatile period so ubiquitous 
a term should possess greater certainty than it presently does. Fur-
thermore, what was once a nice academic debate threatens to jeopard-
ize the potential the concept has for aiding international law dispute 
resolution. In other words, the functional utility of the term is being 
undercut by a confusion in the theory. International law is becoming 
hamstrung by its own limitations. When President Bush hesitates 
before recognizing as legitimate a call to independence by the people 
of Lithuania, (a claim framed initially as a right to self-determina-
tion), his equivocation is based on the confusions and shortcomings of 
international law theory. The point has been reached where, borrow-
ing from Hart, the "penumbra of uncertainty" surrounding the con-
2. The distinction between a 'core of settled meaning' and a 'penumbra of cases' was 
referred to in H.L.A. Hart, Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958), 
and subsequently developed in H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 129 - 50 (1st ed. 1961). 
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cept of self-determination is so pronounced that it obscures the term's 
"core of settled meaning." 
This problem assumes greater importance in the light of the in-
creased reliance on the concept by indigenous peoples and ethnic mi-
norities in a variety of unsettled political situations. The 
Commonwealth of Independent States, bargaining over nuclear stock-
piles and struggling to suppress the dormant nationalist fervor of ap-
proximately 140 minority groups, probably represents the worst 
danger. The threat of the breakup of the Canadian federal system 
presents another. The civil war in Yugoslavia yet another. 
It will be argued here that conventional theoretical approaches to 
self-determination are inadequate insofar as they provide neither a de-
scription of, nor a prescription for, the behavior of states in interna-
tional relations. At a time when an increasing number of claims are 
being made by indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities, not enclosed 
within the parameter of classical, colonial boundaries, the disjunction 
between theory and practice becomes critical. 
It is not within the scope of this paper to provide a complete 
history of self-determination or a complete discussion of its status, 
which have been comprehensively covered elsewhere.3 The following 
two sections will, however, define self-determination in general terms 
and provide a brief overview of the concept's status. Part III will 
discuss the scope and content of self-determination. Specifically, the 
conventional and controversial views of its scope will be set out. State 
practices, opinio juris and textual and jurisprudential issues will be 
examined to determine which view appropriately defines self-determi-
nation. This paper concludes with a proposal to avoid the uncertainty 
created by the dissonance between state practice and the conventional 
view of self-determination. 
II. SELF-DETERMINATION - A BRIEF HISTORY 
A. What Is Self-Determination? 
President Woodrow Wilson, introducing the concept to the 
League of Nations in 1919, described self-determination as "the right 
of every people to choose the sovereign under which they live, to be 
free of alien masters, and not to be handed about from sovereign to 
3. See, e.g., MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 
(1982); A. RIGO-SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION: A 
STUDY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE (1973); U. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972). 
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sovereign as if they were property. "4 
Subsequently, other writers described self-determination as a 
right which arises when there is "international recognition of the 
rights of the inhabitants of a colony to choose freely their indepen-
dence or association with another state"s or when there is a "collec-
tive right of a people sharing similar objective characteristics to freely 
determine their own form of government while further developing 
their economic, social and cultural status. "6 
The definition was further elaborated regarding the manner in 
which the right could be implemented. The right to self-determina-
tion can be exercised in one of three ways - integration, free associa-
tion or independence - but whichever method is chosen, it is clear that 
it is the process itself which is the "essential feature."7 
According to Judge Dillard, in a separate opinion in the Western 
Sahara Case, "It is for people to determine the destiny of the territory 
and not the territory the destiny of the people."8 It will be demon-
strated therefore that self-determination encapsulates three basic 
ideas: 1) there has to be a group; 2) that group has to be concerned 
about its political status; and 3) that group must be able to exercise its 
own choice with regard to its political future. 
Having reduced the concept for present purposes to these three 
elements the next step is to identify areas of inconsistency in relation 
to the term. Uncertainty exists at two levels. First, there is uncer-
tainty surrounding the status of the concept of self-determination at 
international law. Is it a principle of politics, a tool of secessionist 
rhetoric, or has self-determination crystallized into a norm of interna-
tional law? The second issue relates to the question of how to define 
the group. To whom does a right of self-determination apply? Does 
it apply only to groups within colonial boundaries, or all minorities 
however encased? In other words, what exactly is the scope of the 
term? The aim of this paper is to concentrate on the latter problem. 
B. History and Status 
Self-determination, as a principle of international law, originated 
4. Quoted in Eric M. Amberg, Self-Determination in Hong Kong: A New Challenge to an 
Old Doctrine, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839, 842 (1985). 
5. Id. at 840 (quoting Professor Louis Henkin). 
6. John A. Collins, Self Determination in International Law: The Palestinians, 12 CASE 
W. RES. J . INT'L L. 137, 138 (1980). 
7. Western Sahara Case, 1975 l.C.J. 12, para. 57 (Oct. 16). 
8. Id. at 114 (separate opinion of Judge Dillard). 
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following World War I with the development of the mandate9 sys-
tem.10 According to Quincy Wright, the eventual aim of the mandate 
system was to lead the territory under control to self-determination. 11 
In the following two decades, the acceptance of the principle of self-
determination was reflected by, inter alia, its incorporation into the 
Soviet Constitution12 and, most significantly, into article 1 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 13 
In subsequent years, the United Nations' largest representative 
body, the General Assembly, regularly invoked the concept in a series 
of resolutions, the most important of which were passed in 196014 and 
1970. 15 With the emergence of the Group of 77 during the mid-seven-
ties, the concept of self-determination was elevated further on the 
agenda of the United Nations. 16 
Seeking to secure permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth 
and resources in a new international economic order, the third world 
countries emphasized self-determination, anti-colonialism, sovereign 
equality, non-intervention, and the invalidity of unequal treaties in 
their international affairs. 17 
9. The mandate derived from Roman law notions under which property of certain peo-
ples unable to manage their own affairs was placed under the control of a guardian. Sover-
eignty over the property remained with the ward. Grotius describes this situation as a 
separation between "lordship" and "ownership." See 2 Huoo GROTIUS, ON THE LA w OF 
WAR AND PEACE, Book I, 207. 
10. The mandate system was devised by the League of Nations after the first World War, 
as a humanitarian method of administering former colonies of the defeated powers. In 194 7, 
most colonies still under mandate were transferred to U.N. control as trust territories. Collins 
notes a number of other factors which led to the emergence of the mandate concept including: 
19th century nationalism; the American and French revolutions; World War I; and the forma-
tion of the League of Nations. See Collins, supra note 6, at 138 - 40. 
11. QUINCY WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 231 (1930). 
12. Article 29 of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, adopted in 
1917, stated that the USSR's relations with other states were based on, inter alia, "the equal 
rights of peoples and their right to decide their own destiny." Collins, supra note 6, at 140 
(citing KONST. SSSR art. 29 (1917)). 
13. U.N. CHARTER art. 1. 
14. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. 
Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/L323 (1960); G.A. Res. 
1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1966). 
15. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121 (1970). 
16. The Group called on the international community to establish a New International 
Economic Order (N.1.E.0.). The combined influence of the developing, third world and Soviet 
interests, acting as a bloc, altered voting patterns in the U.N. General Assembly, and, at a 
more important structural level, changed the agenda of the Assembly. See generally ROBERT 
F. MEAGHER, AN INTERNATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND POWER: A STUDY 
OF THE CHARTER OF EcONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES (1979). 
17. Amberg, supra note 4, at 840 - 41. 
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The signing of two major Covenants of international law in 
1966, 18 and subsequent decisions of the International Court of Jus-
tice19 (ICJ) further endorsed the concept. As a result, self-determina-
tion became, according to some, "the pre-emptory norm of 
international law. "20 
At the same time, the concept itself remained "highly controver-
sial. "21 The nature of the controversy revolved around two inter-re-
lated issues - what was the status of the concept, and what did it 
include within its scope? This section will concentrate on the former 
point, but in order to do so, it is first necessary to identify three meth-
ods of approaching the status issue. This clarification is required be-
cause assumptions regarding status clearly inform the discussion as to 
what is included within the concept of self-determination. The defini-
tion of the term self-determination will depend, to an extent, on the 
status ascribed to it. If the notion is viewed as lex ferenda, it may be 
acceptable to tolerate some uncertainties of meaning. If, however, 
self-determination is lex /ata, some suggest that it may be only a lim-
ited concept which has achieved this status. This paper is based on 
the premise that the concept is lex /ata, but that a narrow definition of 
self-determination is inappropriate. In other words, the notion of self-
determination has achieved the status of a norm of international law, 
and furthermore, the scope of its application is broadening. 
There are, broadly, three ways to view the question of status. 
The first approach attacks the very notion of self-determination. It 
claims that the concept is vague, ill-defined and lacking in legal con-
tent ~ a concept of "policy and morality"22 rather than positive law. 
18. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter Covenants]. 
19. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 l.C.J. 16 
(June 21) (advisory opinion) [hereinafter Namibia Case]; Western Sahara Case, supra note 7. 
Compare these decisions with the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 
some fifty years earlier, in the Asland Islands Case, L.N.O.J. Special Supp. No. 3, 3 (1920), 
where it held that positive international law did not recognize the right of national groups to 
separate themselves from the state of which they formed a part by a simple expression of a 
wish, any more than it recognized the right of other states to claim such a separation. 
20. POMERANCE, supra note 3, at 1 (emphasis added). 
21. HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NA-
TIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 88 (1988). 
22. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 593 (3d ed. 
1979). Brownlie notes that this approach, which he does not share, was assumed by western 
scholars. Collins states that this school of thought views the concept as "legally intangible, 
ambiguous, problematical, and only partially applicable . . . self-determination is in practice 
unnecessary and invalid." Collins, supra note 6, at 145. 
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A second group, characterized by Schwarzenberger, says, "self-deter-
mination has great potency, but [is] not part and parcel of interna-
tional customary law."23 
The third school assumes that self-determination is part of inter-
national law, but considers there to be disagreement as to the content 
of the concept. Thus, Brownlie in 1979 stated, "The present position 
is that self-determination is a legal principle . . . . Its precise ramifica-
tions in other contexts are not yet worked out. "24 
For present purposes, the view put forward by Brownlie is 
adopted on the basis of the sources of international law as listed in 
article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ25 and interpreted by the court in 
the Nicaragua Case.26 In the court's view, "the material of customary 
international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice 
and opinio juris of States. "27 
Evidence of state practice can be found in a range of sources. 
This includes: 1) the decolonization process of over seventy states 
since 1946; 2) explicit recognition by the member states of the U.N. of 
the right to self-determination by particular groups such as the 
Namibian and Palestinian people; and 3) a growing number of state-
ments by the international community encouraging the acceptance of 
the validity of claims by peoples ranging from the Yugoslav repub-
lics,28 to the Baltics,29 to East Timor.30 Examples of state practice are 
more comprehensively examined in the context of the scope of self-
23. Quoted in DAVID J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 
(3d ed. 1983). 
24. BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 595. 
25. Article 38 provides that the ICJ shall apply international conventions, international 
custom as evidence of general practice, general principles of law, and, as a subsidiary means, 
judicial decisions and teachings of qualified publicists. See Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, art. 38 appended to the U.N. CHARTER, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (1945). 
26. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v U.S.), 1986 
l.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case]. 
27. Id. para. 183. 
28. As of this writing, the United States (The Age, July 4, 1991), Britain (The Age, July 5, 
1991), Germany (The Age, July 5, 1991), the European Community (The Age, July 4, 1991) 
and Australia (The Age, July 5, 1991) have indicated their readiness to accept the Slovenian 
and Croatian claims. See also Mary Curtius, US, Allies Eye Halting Arms to Yugoslavia; Dis-
cuss Recognizing Republics if Federal Army Won't Withdraw, BOSTON GLOBE, July 4, 1991, at 
1. 
29. See for example statements by the United States and Australia calling on the former 
Soviet Union to recognize the Lithuanian Parliament's declaration of independence. The Age, 
March 3, 1991. See also Warren Strobel, Bush Bolsters Ties to Ba/tics, WASH. TIMES, May 13, 
1991, at A7. 
30. Question of East Timor, G.A. Res. 3730, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Agenda Item 97, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/30 (1982). 
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determination, 31 their purpose here being merely to demonstrate that 
such evidence exists. 
Since the Nicaragua Case, it is clear that the second element of 
the test from that case, evidence of opinio juris, may be deduced from 
U.N. General Assembly resolutions.32 Resolutions 1514, 1541 and 
2625 indicate a belief within the international community that self-
determination is a part of customary international law. 33 
Treaties, a further source of law under the Statute of the ICJ, 
also confirm the existence of a legal right. The most representative 
treaties of all time, the U.N. Charter (1947),34 the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (1948),35 and the 1966 International Cove-
31. See discussion infra part III. A. 1. 
32. HARRIS, supra note 23, at 99 (quoting the separate opinion of Judge Dillard in the 
Western Sahara Case, supra note 7); Nicaragua Case, supra note 26, para. 188. 
33. General Assembly Resolution 1S14 (1960), 1S41 (1966) and 262S (1970) all contain 
passages similar in wording to article 1 of the International Covenants of 1966. G.A. Res. 
1Sl4, supra note 14; G.A. Res. 1S41, supra note 14; G.A. Res. 262S, supra note lS. The first of 
these, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples, 
begins with the general proposition that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domina-
tion and exploitation constituted a "denial of fundamental human rights" and is "contrary to 
the Charter of the United Nations." See G.A. Res. 1Sl4, supra note 14. It then states in 
paragraph two that "all peoples have the right to self-determination" and that "immediate 
steps" should be taken in Trust, Non-Self-Governing, and all other territories which have not 
attained independence, to "transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories." Id. para. S. 
General Assembly Resolution 1S41 outlines three possible methods of implementation: 1) in-
dependence; 2) free association; and 3) integration. See G.A. Res. 1S41, supra note 14. The 
third General Assembly Resolution, the 1970 Declaration on The Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, re-asserted the primacy of 
the principle of self-determination. See supra note 1 S. It stated that "all peoples have the right 
to freely determine without external interference, their political status." Id. 
34. One of the purposes of the United Nations under article 1 of the Charter is to "de-
velop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples .... " U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2) (emphasis added). The content 
of the term was developed in article SS which promoted, inter alia, higher standards of living, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms based on the principle of self-determina-
tion. Id. art. SS. The use of the term self-determination in the Charter at articles 1 and SS is 
persuasive evidence for recognizing that such a right existed at international law, although, 
John Humphrey, the first head of the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations, ar-
gues that in 1947 self-determination in the Charter was merely a "political principle" and later 
it became "something else." See HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND 
POLICY ISSUES 194 (Theodore Meron ed., 1984). The majority in the Western Sahara Case 
disagreed and held that the inclusion of the principle in the Charter was indicative of its status 
as law. See Western Sahara Case, supra note 7. 
3S. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/777 
(1948). One of the first actions of the newly created United Nations in 1948 was to begin 
drafting a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although self-determination is not specifi-
cally mentioned in that Declaration, many of the rights listed could be interpreted as being 
elements of a right of self-determination. For instance, under the Declaration everyone has the 
right to own property (art. 17), to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 18) and to 
take part in the government of their country (art. 21). More specifically, article lS provides 
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nants, 36 whether viewed as a source of obligation derived from 
mutually binding promises, or as methods of developing law, indicate 
an acceptance of the concept. The inclusion of self-determination in 
customary international law is reflected also in two major decisions of 
the ICJ.37 
Ill. SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE CONCEPT 
Turning now to the question which is the subject of this paper, 
the major issue to be addressed is, which groups are entitled to exer-
cise a right to self-determination? The critical uncertainty here is 
whether the right of self-determination attaches to all "peoples,"38 in 
a literal sense, or only to those peoples within existing colonial 
boundaries. 
A. The "Conventional" View 
Broadly speaking, two views can be identified in the literature. 
Harris, for example, believes that General Assembly Resolution 1514, 
the first to deal comprehensively with self-determination, contem-
plates self-determination within existing boundaries. He argues, 
pragmatically, that this limitation is necessary in the interests of inter-
national harmony. 39 Accordingly, ethnic minorities, not within defi-
nite colonial boundaries, are not entitled to exercise a right of self-
that everyone has the right "to a nationality" and that no one shall be "arbitrarily deprived" of 
their nationality - two elements implicit in a right of self-determination. Id. 
36. See Covenants, supra note 18. The Covenants are the work of the U.N. Commission 
on Human Rights, whose brief was to translate the principles embodied in the Universal Dec-
laration into treaty law. These then form the basis of the major international obligation in 
relation to self-determination. The Covenants came into force in 1976 and ratifications to date 
number over 90 including Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
German Democratic Republic and Japan. The United States is a signatory to both Covenants. 
37. See Collins, supra note 6, at 145. In its Advisory Opinion in the Namibia Case, the 
ICJ referred to the development of the law since 1920 as encapsulated in the U.N. Charter and 
the General Assembly Resolutions of 1960 and noted that its interpretation of the principles of 
law could not be "unaffected" by the "supervening half century." Namibia Case, supra note 
19, para. 31. It concluded that in order to "faithfully discharge its functions" it could not 
ignore these developments which left "little doubt that the ultimate objective of the sacred 
trust was the self-determination and independence of the peoples concerned." Id. In the West-
ern Sahara Case, the ICJ en<lorsed the abovementioned statements from the Namibia Case and 
referred to Resolution 1541 :0f 1966, which it said "gave effect to the essential feature of the 
right of self-determination." Western Sahara Case, supra note 7, para. 57. 
38. The major U.N. instruments on self-determination, including the human rights Cov-
enants and the resolutions of the General Assembly, provide that the right is possessed by all 
"peoples." See supra notes 14, 15, and 18. 
39. Harris states that "[t]he post-colonial states in particular have taken the view that it 
would be too disruptive of international stability to allow self-determination within those 
boundaries for minorities." HARRIS, supra note 23, at 96. See also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE 
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determination. Presumably therefore, under a strict reading utilizing 
this approach many recent claims would fail. These would include 
for example, claims by the peoples of the republics of the former So-
viet Union40 against Moscow, by Croatia,41 Slovenia42 and Macedo-
nia43 against Yugoslavia, by the Serbian minority of Krajina against 
Croatia, 44 the Bouganville claim against Papua New Guinea;45 and 
the list goes on. Query whether, according to this view, the claims of 
the peoples of Baltic states who are arguably resident within pre-ex-
isting but dormant colonial boundaries would have any validity under 
this approach. 
In Australia, the view which strictly delimits the instances in 
which self-determination can apply was adopted by the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (A.L.R.C.), when it reported in 1986 on 
Aboriginal Customary Law. The A.L.R.C. stated: 
[A]dvocates for ethnic, indigenous or linguistic minorities sometimes 
rely upon the principle or right of self-determination in international 
law as a basis for claims to political or legal recognition. So far how-
ever, the principle has been confined in international practice to situa-
tions involving separate ('colonial') territories politically and legally 
subordinate to an administering power. 46 
The view espoused by the A.L.R.C. will be termed, for present pur-
poses, the "conventional" view. 
B. The "Controversial" View 
A different, and more controversial perspective is adopted by, 
among others, Collins and Nanda. Professor Nanda's thesis is that 
CREATION OF STATES AT INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 - 93 (1979); Wn..SON, supra note 21; 
POMERANCE, supra note 3, at 3; Amberg, supra note 4, at 853. 
40. For example, 98.3% of the 90.5% of Georgians who voted in a recent referendum 
supported independence from Moscow. See THE AGE, Apr. 3, 1991. See also Elizabeth 
Shogren, Soviet Georgians Flock to Polls to Vote for Secession, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1991, at Al. 
41. THE AGE, May 31, 1991. See also Andrew Borowiec, Serbia Plans to Form Small 
Federation, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at AS. 
42. THE AGE, Apr. 29, 1991. See also Borowiec, supra note 41. 
43. THE AGE, Jan. 27, 1991. See also Borowiec, supra note 41. 
44. THE AGE, Apr. 3, 1991. See also Balkan Woes, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Apr. 8, 
1991, at 20. 
45. For a discussion of the Origins of the Bouganville claim see THE AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 
4, 1990. See also Papau New Guinea Prime Minister Namaliu on Bouganville Disturbances, 
Xinhua General Overseas Newswire Service, Apr. 11, 1989, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC 
Library, ALLASI File. 
46. A.L.R.C., REPORT No. 31 RECOGNITION OF ABORIGINAL CUSTOMARY LAW 128 
(1986). 
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the right of self-determination extends beyond the colonial context. 47 
Although in order for the group to qualify for the right, they must 
first satisfy a formal set of criteria. Moreover, Collins states it is only 
political exigencies which have focused the right of self-determination 
onto colonial territories. He argues that: 
although political events have concentrated the UN's focus on colo-
nial territories and the UN stands firm on the concept of territorial 
integrity, the principle of self-determination should not be considered 
strictly as a colonial right. 48 
C. Analysis: Which Approach to Self-Determination Is Appropriate? 
It should be clear then that these two approaches, which have 
been labelled conventional and controversial, are inconsistent. It will 
be argued here that the latter is preferable; that in certain circum-
stances, the right to self-determination should be made available to 
minority groups, as well as states, trusts and non-self governing terri-
tories. This proposition is based on the view that the controversial 
theory of self-determination provides a more accurate explanation of 
the shift in international state practice, as well as a workable prescrip-
tion for the future. The discussion in this section will show that state 
practice and the belief of states regarding that practice is in accord-
ance with the controversial view. Moreover, the conventional view is 
premised on an inherent logical inconsistency, and is unsustainable 
from a jurisprudential perspective. The challenge for international 
law is therefore not to exclude the ever-increasing list of claimants 
because they do not match precisely with an outmoded theory, but to 
find methods for assessing and evaluating the validity of claims ac-
cording to realistic, functional and humanitarian measures. 
1. State Practice and Opinio Juris 
The aim in this part of the paper is to outline the lack of corre-
spondence between international legal theory and state practice and 
consequently show that the exclusion of non-colonially based claims is 
confusing and no longer appropriate. 
Regardless of recent events in Europe and Asia, it is clear that 
during the last fifty years there has already been a marked alteration 
in the international community's perception of when the right to self-
determination arises. A former head of the Human Rights section of 
47. Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to 
Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 266 (1981). 
48. Collins, supra note 6, at 153. 
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the U.N., John Humphrey, argues that when self-determination was 
introduced into the U.N. Charter, at the behest of the former Soviet 
Union, ironically enough, it was clearly with colonial and mandated 
territories in mind. 49 The 1960 Declaration is in accord with that in-
terpretation, and this, he says, was also the prevailing view in the 
U.N.50 Humphrey then goes on, however, to acknowledge that the 
General Assembly had no such limitation in mind when it sanctioned 
the International Covenants in 1966. In his view, the General Assem-
bly intended the word 'peoples' to extend beyond the colonial 
context.51 
It is important to recall that colonial boundaries were the result 
of specific historical circumstances. The desire for territorial or eco-
nomic gain led to the establishment of arbitrary boundaries which 
often cut across traditional spheres, although as Wilson notes, post-
colonial states have in some cases come to accept these boundaries. 52 
In many cases, the rearrangement of peoples into newer colonial units 
produced an alliance of groups which had no reason, other than 
colonialism, for existing. Currently these alliances, which often take 
the form of federations, are coming under increasing pressure from 
resurgent nationalism. Yugoslavia is clearly one of the more tragic 
illustrations of this problem, where years after redrawing the physical 
boundaries of the state, the psychological boundaries which define 
various groups remain as strong as ever. Boundaries, therefore, 
although "legal" in one sense, did not always reflect "practice," in the 
sense of what peoples within those artificial parameters continued to 
value. And whether or not post-colonial states accepted the imposed 
boundaries, it still begs the question of whether these limitations 
should be the critical yardstick by which to determine the validity of a 
self-determillation claim. 
More significantly, from the perspective of international law the-
49. Other commentators take a different view. For example, it has been suggested that 
when the U.N. Charter was drawn up the U.N. Secretariat defined peoples as groups who may 
or may not comprise states or nations. See J. Matthews, Revision of /LO Convention No. 107 
(May 1988) (unpublished manuscript delivered at International Law Association Conference, 
Australian National University). 
50. J.P. Humphrey, Political and Related Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LA w - LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 196 (Theodore Meron ed., 1984). 
51. Id. 
52. Wilson says, in 1968, the Organization for African Unity supported the territorial 
integrity of Nigeria against the Biafran secessionist movement, because to do otherwise "would 
set a dangerous precedent for the political unity of every African country." WILSON, supra 
note 21, at 87. See also the discussion of the uti possidetis doctrine, which prevents the stability 
of the new regime's borders being endangered in Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), 1986 
1.C.J. Y.B. No. 40, at 161. 
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ory, is the confusion or disjunction between law and current events 
which is demonstrated by the fact that a blanket prohibition on the 
rights of minorities seeking self-determination does not accord with 
state practice. Certain minorities have either achieved self-determina-
tion, or are in the process of seeking it, often with international sanc-
tion and recognition, in spite of the conventional view. In recent 
times, the instances of groups seeking and sometimes exercising their 
right to determine their own future are rapidly increasing. Interna-
tional recognition for the claims of the Palestinians, s3 growing sup-
port for the recognition of the right to secedes4 by Slovenia and 
Croatia, ss the Baltic states and perhaps even world response to the 
plight of the Kurds indicate that state practice is slowly building to 
support a shift in view, regardless of the fact that these examples are 
usually rationalized as exceptions to the general rule. s6 For example, 
President George Bush has referred to recognition of independence of 
the Baltic States as being a "special case. "s1 
Events in Yugoslavia illustrate the changed state practice with 
regard to recognized acts of self-determination, even prior to the ap-
pearance of the elements which normally constitute statehood. ss 
Although it is impossible to be precise about the state of events in 
Yugoslavia, it appears that as of this writing the U.s.,s9 Britain,60 
53. See, e.g., Res. ES-7/2: Question of Palestine (1980), reprinted in 18 DuSAN J. DJO-
NOVITCH, UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS: SERIES 1: GENERAL AssEMBLY 479 (1979 - 80). 
54. A right which extends beyond the right simply of self-determination. 
55. THE AGE, July 5, 1991. See also Stephen Kinzer, Europe, Backing Germans, Accepts 
Yugoslav Breakup, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1992, at AlO. 
56. For an example see the view expressed in Richard N. Kiwanuka, The Meaning of 
'People' in the African Charter on Humanitarian and Peoples' Rights, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 80, 90 
(1988), that international recognition for Bangladesh only occurred because of "a set of cir-
cumstances that lent a cloak of legitimacy to what would otherwise be impermissible at inter-
national law." 
57. David Hoffman, Baker Vows Aid for Soviets, Lists Five Principles for Dealings, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 5, 1991, at A34. 
58. The 7th International Conference of American States - Convention on Rights and 
duties of States, Dec. 3 - 26, 1933, art. l, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 75 (1934). Article l lists 4 
elements: permanent population, defined territory, government and capacity to enter into rela-
tions with other States. Recognition also has an effect on statehood although controversy 
remains as to whether its role is "constitutive" or "declaratory." See JOSEPH M. SWEENEY ET 
AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1988). 
59. See THE AGE, July 4, 1991. See also John Mashek, Bush Edges Toward Recognizing 
Ba/tics, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 27, 1991, at 12. 
60. The British Prime Minister John Major was reported as saying, "it may no longer be 
possible to hold the country together." THE AGE, July 5, 1991. See also William Drozdiak, 
Conflicts Over Yugoslav Crisis Sueface in Europe; Debate Pits Principle of Self-Determination 
Against Preserving National Boundaries, WASH. POST, July 5, 1991, at Al5. 
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Germany,61 the European Community,62 and Australia63 have indi-
cated their readiness to recognize the declarations of independence by 
Slovenia and Croatia. 64 
The Baltics provide another example of the practice of states 
shifting to support claims by minorities for self-determination. What 
has been the response of the international community to their claims 
of independence from Moscow? Events have moved with startling ra-
pidity. Just over one year ago one state only, Iceland, had formally 
recognized Lithuania's claim for independence.65 Now recognition of 
independence has been accorded by at least eighteen countries includ-
ing Australia, plus the U.S. and the European Community. The Presi-
dent of the Russian Republic has issued a decree recognizing the 
Baltic republics, as did the President of the defunct Soviet Union. 66 
Even prior to these events Lithuania's claim had already attained 
a certain degree of legitimacy from the international community. The 
U.S. and Australia, among others, were reported as attempting to 
pressure the Soviet Union into accepting Lithuania's declaration. 67 
The U.S., adopting diplomatic means, postponed an important sum-
mit it had planned to hold with the Soviet Union.68 The Soviet 
Union's military response to the Lithuanian movement was con-
demned by the U.S.,69 Japan,70 the European Community71 and Aus-
tralia, 72 and threats were made to suspend aid. 73 It is clear, therefore, 
that while Lithuania's right to self-determination had been recognized 
61. See THE AGE, July 5, 1991. See also Drozdiak., supra note 60. 
62. The European Community was reported to be ready to consider recognition if Bel-
grade refused to stop hostilities. THE AGE, July 4, 1991. See also Curtius, supra note 2S. 
63. See THE AGE, July 5, 1991. 
64. The European Community formally recognized Croatia and Slovenia on January 16, 
1992. See THE AGE, Jan. 16, 1992. See also Stephen Kinzer, Europe, Backing Germans, Ac-
cepts Yugoslav Breakup, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1992, at AlO. It has also recognized Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. See EC Grants Recognition to Bosnia and Herzegovina, THE WEEK IN GER-
MANY, Apr. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, CURRNT File. 
65. See GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Feb. 17, 1991. See also Debran Rowland, Lithuanians 
Mark Independence Day, CHI. TRIB., Feb. lS, 1991, at 7. 
66. See Martin Sieff, Yeltsin Now Calls the Shots, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1991, at Al. 
67. See THE AGE, Mar. 3, 1991. See also Daniel Sneider, Gorbachev Woos and Assails 
West, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, May 9, 1991, at 3. 
6S. See THE AGE, Jan. 30, 1991. See also Don Oberdorfer & Ann Devroy, Bush and 
Gorbachev Postpone Summit, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1991, at Al. 
69. See THE AGE, Mar. 17, 1991. See also U.S. on Secession: Maybe, N.Y. TIMES, June 
2S, 1991, AS. 
70. See THE AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 22, 1991. See also Martin Seiff, Violence Laid to 
Gorbachev's Foes,W ASH. TIMES, May, 3, 1991, at AS. 
71. See THE AGE, Jan. 23, 1991. See also Seiff, supra note 70. 
72. See THE AGE, Jan. 16, 1991. See also Seiff, supra note 70. 
73. See THE AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 22, 1991. See also Seiff, supra note 70. 
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by only one state, many others have implicitly indicated that, at the 
very least, they did not accept the Soviet Union's outright rejection of 
the Lithuanian claim. At the most, the negative response of these 
states can be interpreted as tacit approval of Lithuania's claim. If so, 
further support is lent to the argument that examples of state practice 
are incrementally building toward a re-examination of traditional 
theory. 
The proposal for the establishment of a safe haven for Kurdish 
refugees from the Iraqi regime, regardless of whether it succeeds or 
not, also lends support to a change in practice. The territorial integ-
rity of Iraq was affected by the allies' action in establishing the en-
clave and subsequent recognition of the Kurdish claim for full 
autonomy by the allies further confirms the allies' support of Kurdish 
claims for self-determination. Although it is clear that protection of 
the Kurds does not translate automatically into support for their right 
to self-determination, the allied intervention ensures that the Kurdish 
claim is kept alive, and may be a preliminary step necessary for the 
attainment of that goal. In addition, a U.S. Military Report specifi-
cally recognized as an objective the attainment of a permanent, secure 
and autonomous Kurdish region. 74 The Kurdish example indicates 
that a "people," subject to alien domination not within defined colo-
nial borders, have been allocated, with the sanction and active contri-
vance of three significant powers and the U.N., a safe haven or 
enclave within the territory of another state. 75 A safe haven is clearly 
one important element towards achieving a successful claim for self-
determination. 
In principle, acceptance of a right to limited self-government for 
the Palestinian people has been recognized by Israel. 76 In view of the 
fact that self-determination is about the process of allowing a group to 
determine their political future, rather than any one particular result, 
Israel's acceptance is significant. 
Two final examples of the shift in state practice concern the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (C.S.F.R.) and Eritrea. C.S.F.R. 
President Vaclav Havel has indicated that the Slovakian people have a 
74. See THE AUSTRALIAN, May 5, 1991. See also Paper: U.S. May Seek Autonomous 
Kurdish Region, CHI. TRIB., May 5, 1991, at 19. 
75. See GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Apr. 28, 1991. See also Paper: U.S. May Seek Autono-
mous Kurdish Region, CHI. TRIB., May 5, 1991, at 19. 
76. See THE AGE, Jan. 16, 1992. See also Norman Kempster & Daniel Williams, Israel 
OKs Talks on Arab Self-Rule, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1992, at Al. 
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right to secede, as long as it is done in a constitutional manner. 77 Sim-
ilarly, the new Ethiopian government has reportedly adopted a char-
ter recognizing the right of self-determination for all its nationalities, 
as long as the appropriate referendum is held, and has affirmed the 
right of the Eritreans in the north of the state to secede. 78 
The aforementioned examples do not confuse the political princi-
ple of self-determination with the legal right of self-determination, but 
recognize the facts of self-determination. There is a large and growing 
body of evidence indicating that the attitudes of the international 
community towards the right of minorities to assert a claim for self-
determination are changing. As the ICJ stated in the Nicaragua Case, 
these facts constitute the most potent evidence of the state of custom-
ary international law. 79 If self-determination is to have any contem-
porary relevance, then, it must be taken to include the situation where 
ethnic minorities may exercise this right. 
2. Textual Issues 
An analysis of the texts which represent the conventional view of 
self-determination also reveals that it is based on a circular argument. 
It asserts that apart from States, trusts and non-self-governing territo-
ries or categories listed in Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter, the right is 
available only to those territories which possess a status similar to 
that of a non-self-governing territory. Crawford, for example, offers 
an additional rather vague category of situations, apart from the stan-
dard ones, where self-determination may also be relevant: 
[Possibly] other territories forming distinct political geographical ar-
eas, whose inhabitants do not share in the government either of the 
region or of the State to which the region belongs, with the result that 
the territory becomes in effect . .. non-self-governing.80 
Similarly, Wilson believes that the right does not entail a right of se-
cession from a self-governing state, "unless a part of that State has 
become effectively non-self-governing with respect to the whole."81 
These arguments beg the critical question. Nowhere do they de-
fine how or when the territory in question becomes non-self-governing. 
They merely answer the problems by restating it. What does becom-
77. See THE AGE, July 9, 1991. See also Mary Battiata, Separatist Slovaks Becoming 
More Vocal in 'Family Feud' with Czechs, WASH. PosT, Mar. 19, 1991, at A21. 
78. See THE AGE, July 5, 1991. See also Robert M. Press, Ethiopians Opt for Transition 
to Democracy, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, July 5, 1991, at 1. 
79. See Nicaragua Case, supra note 26. 
80. Crawford, supra note 39, at 101 (emphasis added). 
81. WILSON, supra note 21, at 87. 
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ing "in effect non-self-governing" or "effectively non-self-governing" 
mean? This is the crux of the whole self-determination issue, the need 
to formulate a legal method for determining when a particular entity 
has become "non-self-governing." 
The deficiency of the conventional view is that by failing to for-
mulate specific principles with which to assess a claim, it avoids the 
most controversial aspect of the right to self-determination. This is 
not an attack merely on the lack of clarity of the traditional view; the 
"legality" of a right is not diminished or increased by the uncertainty 
of its content. The conventional view is clear enough within a limited 
scope, but it does not provide an explanation or guide for when the 
right does arise beyond the traditional categories, categories which no 
longer cover the varieties of groups seeking to exercise the right. 
3. Jurisprudential Issues 
Assuming then that the conventional view of self-determination 
theory is no longer appropriate, on the basis both of developing state 
practice and inherent logical inconsistencies, it is interesting to con-
sider how and why it has for so long been accepted. Furthermore, 
why has that acceptance been accompanied by continual academic 
controversy? The confusion of international opinion in this area is an 
example of what one jurisprudential approach would call a "crisis" in 
the "interpretive" community's "structure of beliefs."82 This theory 
asserts that change in law comes about when the exceptions to a gen-
eral rule are too numerous to rationalize. A "crisis" in the law results 
which can only be resolved by the reconciliation of the exceptions 
under a new rule, which thus moderates or changes the original rule. 
This reconciliation can only occur through an alteration in the com-
munity's belief structure and this happens when a sufficiently persua-
sive argument is formulated to explain the exceptions. In this 
manner, the law gradually evolves and retains the illusion (often fos-
tered in law schools) of being simultaneously "static and yet dy-
namic." For example, Katz explains the process by reference to 
Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific change: 
Discovery commences with the awareness of an anomaly . . . . It then 
continues with a more or less extended exploration of the area of the 
anomaly. And it closes only when the paradigm theory has been ad-
82. See, e.g., M.F. Katz, After the Deconstruction: Law in the Age of Post-Structuralism, 
24 U. W. ONTARIO L. REV. 51, 57 - 58 (1986). 
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justed so that the anomalous has become the expected. 83 
Academic opinion regarding self-determination is currently in a 
state of "crisis." The profusion of debate reflects a period in which 
there is an "extended exploration of the anomaly." Berman refers to 
aspects of the debate as "the paradox of self-determination. " 84 The 
mass of writing on the subject is evidence of the unsettled state of the 
law. Crawford's usage of the word "possibly" to qualify the applica-
tion of self-determination to territories outside conventional theories 
only highlights the uncertainties. The recapitulation of the general 
rule, and attempts to explain or rationalize exceptions under the gen-
eral rule, are unconvincing. They do not accord with either legal or 
political reality. There is a growing list of examples where a right to 
self-determination has been recognized regardless of its failure to fit 
conventional theoretical requirements. This list of examples includes 
the Baltic States, Croatia and Slovenia, and recent Israeli statements 
regarding a Palestinian right to limited self-government, to name a 
few. At this stage, it is sufficient to point out that politically and le-
gally certain entities have successfully asserted their right to self-de-
termination while others continue to do so. What is needed in order 
to resolve the "crisis" is a reformulation of the original rule. Other-
wise, the factual exceptions cannot be reconciled. 
It has been suggested here that there is an uncertainty in interna-
tional law theory regarding when the right of self-determination ap-
plies; that this confusion has rendered the term incapable of 
application to the wide variety of situations it is being called upon to 
mediate; and, that reformulation of the conventional approach is nec-
essary to reconcile factual exceptions. The controversial approach to 
the interpretation of self-determination more accurately reflects cur-
rent state practice, and should therefore be formally recognized as the 
appropriate international law standard. 
D. Issues for the Future 
Adoption of the controversial approach to self-determination will 
undoubtedly be accompanied by a range of new and complex issues. 
For example, the most serious of these problems is the potential effect 
a successful bid for self-determination by a group in one state, may 
have on a neighboring state which also contains the same grouping. 
83. See id. at 56 (citing THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
90 (1967)). 
84. N. Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law, 7 
WIS. INT'L L.J. 51, 52 (1988). 
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In this context, the Chinese have expressed concern over the effect 
that independence for Kazakhstan may have over the large Kazakh 
minority in the Xinjiang province. ss Serbs in the Croatian region of 
Krajina will also pose a problem for any independent Croatian state. 86 
Inter-ethnic rivalries within newly independent Soviet republics 
also create serious problems for international stability. It is difficult 
to keep abreast of the ever burgeoning list of minorities claiming 
rights, often against an entity which itself has just successfully as-
serted its right to self-determination. The Ossetians in Georgia, the 
self-proclaimed Dnieper Republic in Moldava and the Crimean au-
tonomous republic in the Southern Ukraine87 are examples of just a 
few claims by minorities within former minority entities. 
Apart from a proliferation of claims which could result from the 
adoption of the controversial view, the other major issue concerns the 
area of implementation. How quickly and effectively can interna-
tional and domestic constitutional law theory respond to the urgent 
need to construct new forms of power sharing to accommodate the 
proliferation of demands? Remembering that self-determination is 
not necessarily synonymous with complete independence, the "shape" 
of new forms of federal structures will be extremely important. The 
formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its rapid re-
placement by the Commonwealth of Independent States with as yet 
undefined responsibilities in significant areas of economic and defense 
control illustrates the need for some creative legal thinking on the 
effect of self-determination on the constitutional structure of states. 
Or will self-determination translate into the forms of power re-
distribution being experimented with in relation to indigenous peoples 
in Canada, New Zealand and to a lesser extent Australia? For exam-
ple, will Canada proceed with a proposal by the notedly conservative 
Canadian Bar Association to introduce a separate system of justice for 
native Canadians? Will the New Zealand experience of placing land 
claims in a separate tribunal and allowing first offenders in the crimi-
nal justice system to be punished in consultation with Maori leaders 
constitute new forms of effective self-government? 
These and a host of other issues accompany a shift in interna-
tional law to the more controversial approach to self-determination. 
85. See Lena H. Sun, China Fears that Fever of Soviet Ethnic Conflicts Could Cross Bor-
der, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1991, at Al6. 
86. See Laura Silber et al., Serbian Leaders' Dispute Threatens UN Peace Plans, FINAN-
CIAL TIMES, Feb. 4, 1992, at 2. 
87. See THE AGE, Sept. 7, 1991. See also Walter Laqueur, Independence May Enslave 
Millions, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1991, at M5. 
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It is suggested here, however, that these questions should be incorpo-
rated into the criteria to be applied in assessing a claim, or resolved at 
the domestic level, rather than automatically preventing the right 
from being exercised. Otherwise, the term self-determination is in 
danger of losing any useful currency it may have once possessed as a 
principle of international law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It has been argued here that conventional theoretical approaches 
to self-determination are inadequate insofar as they provide neither a 
description of, nor a prescription for, the behavior of states in interna-
tional relations. To be useful to the field of international dispute reso-
lution, international law theory should be functional, as well as 
analytical. This is particularly true when we are witnessing an in-
creasing number of claims by indigenous peoples and ethnic minori-
ties, not enclosed within the parameter of colonial boundaries, but 
who nevertheless wish to exercise their right to self-determination, a 
right which is part of international customary law. To date, the right 
is denied on the basis that the group does not "fit" the theory. The 
resulting dissonance between state practice and the conventional law 
on self-determination has led to an unacceptable level of uncertainty 
in the application of the law. A way out of this uncertainty has been 
proposed, utilizing existing tools of the discourse, to improve and re-
fine the current paradigm. 
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